I have to say, though, that Hamas once saved my life by preventing a kidnapping in Gaza.
The terrorist organisation responsible for killing civilians, kidnapping people, and cynically putting their own people in peril stopped an Islamist gang from stealing me from the Hotel Deira in northern Gaza in 2008.
Hamas intelligence agents surrounded the hotel with quiet efficiency. Nothing was shot.
The kidnapping gang blew up the nearby British Council offices in a fit of rage after being sidetracked from its intended target.
The previous Hamas was that. Yes, a violent organisation with a track record of using terror methods against Israelis and a long-standing dedication to overthrowing the state of Israel (though not one of committing genocide against Jews or Israelis), but it is also a political Islam social movement with a solid reputation in the Arab world for effectiveness and integrity.
However, the violent Palestinian group has always been cynical in its use of force and maintenance of a mythology of martyrs.
When Israeli forces used live fire in the Palestinian territories during the second Intifada in 2000 against both armed terrorists and unarmed civilians, Hamas launched waves of suicide bombers and insisted on “celebrating” the murder of Palestinian children as martyrs.
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin gasped and peeped during a covert meeting in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, in the beginning of 2001. The only member of the group who could understand the sounds he made was the interpreter through whom he communicated to me.
The founder of Hamas, who has used a wheelchair since he was young, asserted that although “Israelis love life,” “we celebrate the greatest gift of martyrdom for our children.” That is what every mother want for her child.
He was assassinated by the Israelis a few weeks later.
However, the profound victimhood and zeal for martyrdom that characterised his organisation persisted. In fact, it grew deeper when Hamas assumed control of Gaza and ran the risk of subjecting its citizens to Israeli ground invasions and air bombings, which were frequently sparked by Hamas attacks.
Hamas’ strategy has already been characterised by cycles of violence and peace, depending on which of its wings—civilian or military—took power.
One powerful military leader in Hamas has consistently been adamantly opposed to any sort of peace with what Hamas insists on calling the “Zionist Entity.”
Mohammed Diab Ibrahim al-Masri is also referred to as El Deif (the Guest) because for many years he has slept each night in a different home to avoid being discovered and assassinated by Israel. He is currently in command of the Al Qassem Brigades, the military branch of Hamas.
El Deif, who is thought to have been born in the 1960s, is not well-known to the majority of Palestinians, claims Mkhaimar Abusada, a political science professor at Al Azah University in Gaza.
He claimed that the majority of Palestinians view him as being somewhat phantom-like.
The 1993 Oslo Accords, which were meant to pave the way for a two-state solution in which a new Palestine coexisted peacefully with Israel, and the peace process supported by Yassir Arafat, the then-leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, were opposed by the Al Qassem Brigades.
El Deif, a skilled bomb maker, was responsible for a string of four suicide assaults that claimed 65 lives in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in 1996, among other atrocities meant to sabotage the peace process.
After winning the Palestinian elections the previous year, Hamas took control of Gaza from its rival Fatah, and Israel and Egypt tightened their control over the enclave, which is home to some 2 million people.
Many Palestinians consider Hamas to be the best alternative to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is ruled by the larger Palestine Liberation Organisation and Fatah. In spite of the fact that the PA solely controls the West Bank, polls last summer revealed that support for the PA in Gaza was still at or above 70%.
In Gaza, support for Hamas has hardly ever shifted much past 50%. Furthermore, it has been challenging to locate individuals who actually support Hamas’ military campaigning on the ground or in private conversations. But few people are willing to criticise openly and run the risk of being arrested.
Israel’s policies regarding the West Bank, where Jewish settlements that are against international law have steadily expanded throughout the occupied territories, regarding access to the Al Aqsa Mosque complex in Jerusalem, and regarding the futile attempts to forge a workable two-state solution allowed Hamas to turn resentment into a weapon. In the cramped neighbourhood that locals refer to as the “biggest prison in the world,” the movement is never short on volunteers.
Hamas (and other factions) acquired military tools to fight back the more Israeli and Egyptian control over Gaza’s borders tightened.
Rockets are the most notable one. The missiles were initially crude, but with years of assistance from Iran, they have been upgraded and perfected.
The Tehran theocracy, which was similarly committed to destroying the Jewish state, trained engineers, arranged technological transfers, and directed research and development to build rockets that might strike Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
Israel sought out men like El Deif, the bomb-makers and decision-makers.
His wife and children were murdered in an airstrike in 2014. He also suffered hearing loss and arm and leg amputations. His animosity for Israel undoubtedly grew then.
But zealous cunning blended with his emotions. The first and most significant deceit involved changing how Israel saw Hamas.
Under El Deif’s leadership, Hamas has sought to persuade Israel during the past two years that its priorities are internal matters, such as rebuilding Gaza, gaining work permits for individuals seeking jobs in Israel, and strengthening its infrastructure.
According to Abusada, the Gazan scholar, “the Israelis have felt that, in the long run, Hamas is known more for these policies than that there will be a call for a military confrontation with Israel.”
Even so, Hamas was preparing a big attack that would dispel any notion in Israel and elsewhere that the Islamic Resistance had lost its strategic edge.
Yahya Sinwar, a prominent member of Hamas’ military branch, was also essential to this change. He was the commander of the Al Qassem brigades before becoming the leader of Hamas in Gaza.
He concentrated his efforts on fostering ties with foreign nations, particularly Egypt and Iran.
The weekend onslaught by Hamas on Israel was the biggest military failure for Israel since 1973. Back then, during Yom Kippur, Syria and Egypt unexpectedly attacked Israel. The Arabs were initially victorious, but as Israel united, they were quickly driven back.
Israel is currently deploying more troops to its northern frontier, where it faces Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran, and to its borders with Gaza and Lebanon.
What is the ultimate goal of Hamas’ murderous gamble? “They may have been planning this for years and thinking through what they can do,” said Karim von Hippel, head of the Royal United Services Institute in London, “because everything else they have tried, hasn’t worked.”
But this also won’t work, I’m sure of it. This, in my opinion, will be the demise of Hamas.
Even the mysterious El Deif had not anticipated that possibility being a zero-sum one.